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I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing internationalization of commercial transactions 
creates a need to accelerate efforts to harmonize commercial and 
regulatory conflicts between states as well as each state’s domestic law 
with international law.1 In particular, tax obligations that enterprises and 
individuals owe to the different states in which they earn income or 
reside create unique compliance and tax minimization issues. 
Governments must strive to achieve the fine balance of protecting their 
tax revenue base while fostering international economic expansion. It is 
clear that international bodies and sovereign governments are not 
ignorant of these challenges, and the multi- and bi-lateral tax treaties 
enacted in response to these issues represent some of the most advanced 
and robust forms of international legal cooperation. However, conflicts 
inevitably arise as nations and multinational enterprises seek to create 
equilibrium between cooperation and self-interest on the international 
playing field. 
This paper discusses conflicts between international and domestic 
law and describes how international law attempts to manage them. Part 
(II) provides a general overview and an example of conflicts that occur at 
an international level in taxation while also describing the multinational 
and bilateral methods that governments use to harmonize tax laws. Part 
(III) discusses the interrelationship between tax treaties and domestic tax 
law. It specifically addresses (A) treaty abuse and shopping, (B) 
interpretative issues, and (C) international treaty override by domestic 
governments. Although this paper relates solely to tax treaties, the same 
approach could also apply to other areas involving international treaties, 
such as the free trade agreements or the specific laws that govern 
international commercial negotiable instruments, trade, and tariffs. The 
main analysis of this paper, which deals with the concept and application 
of “treaty override,” is especially applicable across the wide spectrum of 
international treaty law.  
II. INTERNATIONAL TAX CONFLICTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
TAX REGIME 
                                   
* Ph.D. in International Tax (University of Seoul), LLM & LLM in Taxation (School of Law, 
Temple University), Associate at Lee & Han International. Special thanks to Nathan Archibald and 
all the other editors for their hard work on this article. The author may be contacted at 
sshan@leeandhan.com. 
1 For related discussion on this topic, see the author’s prior article, Sung-Soo Han, A Study On 
The Development Of A Global Community From A Legal Perspective, 7 BYU INT’L L. & MGM’T R. 
71 (2010).  
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It is not uncommon for an individual or corporate entity to reside or 
incorporate in one country, yet make a taxable gain in another. If they are 
taxed in both the jurisdiction in which they earned income as well as the 
jurisdiction where they reside, the income is “double-taxed.” Double 
taxation, while perhaps protecting some forms of revenue for each nation, 
has a counterproductive, “chilling” effect on international trade, which 
decreases the overall benefit international trade has on a nation’s 
economic growth and fiscal policy. The example just mentioned above is 
a simple double taxation problem. However, when a multinational 
enterprise performs transactions across multiple contracting states, it 
obviously faces more complex and diverse tax issues, such as whether 
the enterprise is a resident;2 where the enterprise can declare interest, 
dividends and royalty payments;3 and how and where the enterprise can 
move capital4 for tax purposes.  
From a government’s perspective, deliberate tax evasion is a central 
threat to its revenue base. Domestic tax evasion occurs when individuals 
or companies misrepresent or conceal tax liability or deductions. In an 
international world however, the scope and opportunity for tax evasion 
increases markedly. Without treaty assistance, domestic tax authorities 
struggle to track and recover tax revenue on an international scale.5 The 
specific issue that this paper focuses on is domestic tax evasion as it 
applies to international norms: manipulation and abuse of treaty benefits.  
A. History of International Tax Treaties 
A high level of international cooperation has been achieved to 
protect individual states and their taxpaying citizens from the inequities 
of the issues referred to above, primarily double taxation and tax evasion. 
The modern multinational approach began in the 1920’s with the League 
of Nations, which drafted the first model tax convention in 1928 for use 
by member countries. Its work culminated in the widely-used Model 
                                   
2 For an example on “residency” issues see infra Part III.B.  
3 See, for example, Korean “thin capitalization rule” discussed infra Part III.C. 
4 See, for example, Germany’s response to the flight of capital to Ireland discussed infra Part 
III.A. 
5 For example, the Swiss-German tax treaty currently being negotiated will give Germany 
Switzerland’s “special assistance” in cases where there is evidence of tax evasion by Germans. It is 
estimated that the German money held by Swiss money managers is $264 billion. The German 
accord follows standards set out in Switzerland’s agreement with the OECD in March 2009 after the 
country was threatened with being blacklisted as a tax haven. See Warren Giles, Swiss-German Tax 
Treaty May End European Bank Secrecy, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-01/swiss-german-tax-treaty-may-end-european-bank-
secrecy.html. 
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Convention of Mexico (1943). The League of Nations dissolved in 1946, 
but the mantle of tax cooperation was picked up by the Organization for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), a body of seventeen 
European nations administering plans for reconstruction after World War 
II. The OEEC adopted its first model concerning double tax regimes in 
1955. In 1961, the OEEC merged into a supranational body of developed 
nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), founded by the original European countries, the United States, 
Canada, and thereafter, fourteen other modern industrial nations.6 The 
first OECD draft tax convention was adopted in 19637 and reformatted 
in 1977,8 hereinafter referred to as the “OECD Model Convention.” This 
convention was designed to be ambulatory in nature, updated in 
accordance with legislative and judicial development concerning 
economic, commercial, and domestic factors.9 
The OECD Model Convention has had wide repercussions on the 
negotiation, application and interpretation of tax conventions, as 
evidenced by the fact that most bilateral treaties, irrespective of whether 
they are made by OECD member countries, conform to the pattern and 
main provisions of the OECD Model Convention.10 It also served as the 
basis of the original drafting of the complimentary United Nations 
model.11 Notwithstanding its limited membership, the OECD Model 
Convention “has achieved a consensus position as the benchmark against 
which essentially all tax treaty negotiations take place,” far wider than 
the U.N. model.12 The OECD also publishes a series of Commentaries, 
                                   
6 The following are the current members of the OECD and their date of membership: Australia 
(June 7, 1971), Austria (Sept. 29, 1961), Belgium (Sept. 13, 1961), Canada (Apr. 10, 1961), Chile 
(May 7, 2010), Czech Republic (Dec. 21, 1995), Denmark (May 30, 1961), Estonia (Dec. 9, 2010), 
Finland (Jan. 28, 1969), France (Aug. 7, 1961), Germany (Sept. 27, 1961), Greece (Sept. 27, 1961), 
Hungary (May 7, 1996), Iceland (June 5, 1961), Ireland (Aug. 17, 1961), Israel (Sept. 7, 2010), Italy 
(Mar. 29, 1962), Japan (Apr. 28, 1964), Korea (Dec. 12, 1996), Luxembourg (Dec. 7, 1961), Mexico 
(May 18, 1994), Netherlands (Nov. 13, 1961), New Zealand (May 29, 1973), Norway (July 4, 1961), 
Poland (Nov. 22, 1996), Portugal (Aug. 4, 1961), Slovak Republic (Dec. 14, 2000), Slovenia (July 
21, 2010), Spain (Aug. 3, 1961), Sweden (Sept. 28, 1961), Switzerland (Sept. 28, 1961), Turkey 
(Aug. 2, 1961), United Kingdom (May 2, 1961), United States (Apr. 12, 1961). 
7 Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL 8 (2010), http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/2310081E.PDF [hereinafter 
OECD]. 
8 Id.  
9 See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, Technical Explanation, at 1, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmtech.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION]. 
10 See OECD, supra note 7, at 9.  
11  U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION 
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at vi, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21 (2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21. 
12  Peter A. Barnes, A Model to Celebrate, OECD OBSERVER, Oct. 2008, 
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which have become a widely accepted guide to the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of bilateral conventions.13 
B. International Tax Treaties in Developed Nations 
The use of tax treaties is particularly important for U.S. citizens, who 
are subject to having taxes levied on their income, wherever in the world 
they reside or earn their income.14 The United States has its own Model 
Convention,15 drawn heavily from the OECD Model Convention. As of 
2010, the United States had signed bilateral tax treaties with sixty six 
different countries, comprised mostly of its major industrial trading 
partners around the world.16 To put this level of activity in perspective, 
to date, the United States is party to bilateral trade agreements (free-trade 
agreements) with only nine countries,17  not including the countries 
participating in the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR). 
The European Union itself does not have a supranational tax treaty or 
model. It relies on the existing network of double tax treaties to which 
most of its members are party in one form or another. Although it has 
had the opportunity to co-opt the approach of the federated United States 
in creating a unified system sans tax conflict,18 to date it has not done 
                                                                              
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2742/. 
13 OECD, supra note 7, at 10. 
14 See 26 I.R.C. § 911 (2010). Note however that the treaties also benefit the U.S. resident of 
foreign citizenship who may be taxed at a reduced rate or be exempt from U.S. taxes on certain items 
of income that they receive from sources within the U.S. Most U.S. income tax treaties also contain 
a "saving clause," which stops a citizen or resident of the U.S. from using the provisions of a tax 
treaty in order to avoid taxation of U.S. source income. 
15 See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 9. 
16  The U.S. has tax treaties with: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), United Kingdom, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. 
17 The U.S. has trade agreements with: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, 
Oman, and Singapore. U.S. trade agreements with Panama, Korea, and Colombia are pending 
congressional approval. The U.S. is also in negotiations on trade agreements with Malaysia, 
Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which 
includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.  
18 For example, the manner in which interstate commerce is shielded from multiple tax 
regimes. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 
U.S. 298 (1992); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
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so.19  
Most tax treaty work occurs between developed industrial countries. 
The process of negotiating and chartering a tax treaty is an expensive 
process, and nations have normally utilized treaties only when it has been 
in their obvious economic interest.  Factors such as the level of trade-
ties between nations, the degree of personnel movement (immigrant and 
non-immigrant), and geographic proximity all influence a country’s 
decision to negotiate tax treaties. The major exception to this trend is in 
developing countries where there is a preventative interest in ensuring 
that a state does not become a “tax haven.”20 However, with respect to 
developing nations without tax treaty coverage, the OECD notes that 
these countries in particular are disadvantaged because their small 
populations of wealthy citizens who rely on tax treaties negotiated with 
other countries.21 Because of this disadvantage, the U.N. has sought to 
accommodate the interests of developing countries with its tax model 
(essentially the OECD Model Convention modified to take account of 
special interests for developing countries).22 The OECD itself, despite its 
exclusive membership, has organized annual meetings since 1996 where 
experts from non-OECD member countries can contribute to the 
negotiation, application, and interpretation of tax conventions.23 For the 
sake of being inclusive, the OECD publishes the reservations and 
objections of non-OECD members separate to its Model and 
Commentaries.24 
III. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX TREATIES AND 
DOMESTIC TAX LAW 
Tax treaties and domestic laws are theoretically designed to work in 
harmony. After all, the treaties are negotiated by sovereign governments 
to protect their own interests and are based on generally accepted and 
                                   
19 Christiana HJI Panayi, Multistate Cumulative Tax Burdens and Reliefs in the European 
Community - Lessons from the United States, 47 EUROPEAN TAXATION 15 (2007).  
20 See Income and Capital Tax Convention US – Barb., Jan. 1, 1984, TIAS 11090.  
21 See Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Secretariat of the OECD, Abuse 
of Tax Treaties and Treaty Shopping, 1st Sess., Dec. 5-9, 2005, E/C.18/2005/2, (Dec. 5, 2005). 
22 For example, one modifications is that of “tax-sparing” encouraged as between developed 
nations and developing nations which “spares” investors from being taxed on the tax incentives they 
receive from developing nations to foster cross-border investment. See Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A 
Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue 
Sacrifice? QUEENS L.J., Spring 2009, 505, 508. See also Aldo Forgione, Weaving the Continental 
Web: Exploring Free Trade, Taxation, and the Internet, L. & BUS. REV. AM. 513, 542 (2003). 
23 See OECD, supra note 7, at 429. 
24 See id, at 430-63. 
SPRING 2011  Tax Treaties  
34 
 
time-tested models, such as the OCED Model Convention. Furthermore, 
there is no coercive force used in the treaty negotiation stages, and in 
most cases, the treaty is meant to protect sovereign revenue and grow 
industrial and trade relations. However, as in any seemingly sound treaty, 
subsequent issues arise. For example, NAFTA provisions (not tax related) 
allowed Mexican trucks to be driven on U.S. highways, but the United 
States has delayed its domestic approval process in clear contravention of 
its treaty obligations, and in a manner which has caused retaliatory bans 
from Mexico. 25  In a similar manner, domestic implementation and 
compliance issues arise on a regular basis in relation to tax treaty 
harmonization with domestic law. In order to understand the impact 
treaty override has on international legal tax norms, a brief review of 
treaty shopping, abuse, and interpretation is helpful.  
A. Treaty Abuse and Shopping 
Within the rubric of treaty law lies the general problem of avoidance 
or “shopping” activities that were not directly envisaged or addressed by 
a specific treaty. This is the practical limitation on any treaty activity, 
especially those directed at taxpayers: once it is enacted, sophisticated 
teams of accountants and lawyers with aggressive tax practices will 
create “work-throughs” and “work-arounds” to minimize their clients’ 
tax liability. Further, tax treaties are not by nature “nimble.” They require 
significant time to replace or amend. A tax treaty is normally effective 
for decades upon its conclusion, and it is not easy to simply insert an 
anti-avoidance rule—that is, a specific rule that attempts to counter 
aggressive tax avoidance schemes, into a tax treaty after its conclusion. 
Apart from the practicalities of negotiation, tax treaties are designed to 
be difficult to change, in order to provide multinational investors with 
long-term planning guidance. Therefore, “early adopters” of aggressive 
tax-shopping or abuse strategies can be years ahead of any international 
law reform. 
The OECD has long been concerned with treaty abuse as a major 
challenge to the interaction between tax treaties and specific provisions 
in domestic law. It admits that it is naïve to think that treaty drafters can 
imagine all abusive schemes in advance and prospectively draft a treaty 
to protect against them.26 However, the OECD has been responsive to 
some treaty abuse issues by adding to its Model Convention the 
                                   
25 See H.R. 6630, 110th Cong. (2008). 
26 See Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, supra note 21, at 7. 
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"beneficial owner" 27  and “special relationship” rules, applicable to 
interest and royalties.28 States have also attempted to be nimble in their 
treaty drafting; for example, U.S. treaties now include a comprehensive 
“limitation of benefits” provision29 Similarly, Britain includes provisions 
to cover interstate dividends, royalties, etc.30 
Notwithstanding the efforts to be responsive to threats of abuse, 
these actions have limitations. One of the problems with treaty anti-
avoidance measures is that in order to adequately respond to complex 
avoidance strategies, complex rules may be required.31 This can be 
counterproductive because it may restrict the ability of the domestic 
legislatures to respond (i.e. it may be seen to “cover the ground”). In 
addition, complex rules are difficult to draft in a timely fashion. 
Furthermore, a complex anti-abuse mechanism carries the risk of being 
literally interpreted and thereby “catching” non-abusive transactions.32  
That said, not all aggressive tax schemes are “abuse” of the treaty 
regime. Some efforts to avoid tax liability are expressly what the treaty is 
enacted to do (i.e. avoid double taxation). Abuse therefore is a fluid 
concept, and the OECD itself does not give a precise definition.33 An 
attempt to define “treaty abuse” has some value when defined in these 
terms: “where the particular use of a tax treaty (i) has the sole intention 
to avoid the tax of either or both of the contracting states, and (ii) defeats 
fundamental and enduring expectations and policy objectives shared by 
both states and therefore the purpose of the treaty in a broad sense.”34 In 
other words, the term implies an indirect contravention of treaty law, one 
that is opposed to the goal and objectives of the treaty. Defining “treaty 
abuse” requires looking at concepts of bona fides and “intent,” including 
the intent of the government, the treaty, and the tax-payer. Obviously this 
is imprecise and subjective, but tax lawyers are invariably accustomed to 
concepts of judging “form over substance.”35 In any event, states are 
better equipped to make this judgment when taking into account local 
                                   
27 See OECD, supra note 7, arts. 10, 11, and 12. 
28 See id, art. 11, para. 6 and art. 12, para. 4. 
29 “Limitations on benefits” provisions restrict third country residents from obtaining treaty 
benefits; for example, a foreign corporation may have a minimum percentage of citizen/resident 
shareholders entitled to a reduced rate of withholding under a treaty. 
30 See UK/Australia Double Tax Convention, U.K.-Austl., Aug. 21, 2003, art. 10, para. 7 and 
art. 12, para. 7. 
31 See OECD, supra note 7, at 9. 
32 See id.  
33 See id. at 12. 
34 STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES 117 (1998). 
35 See Knetsch v. U.S., 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 561 
(1978). 
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circumstances and legal traditions.  
“Treaty shopping”36 is a particular type of abuse.37 It refers to a 
practice whereby third-country corporate and personal nationals use a 
“tax-haven”38 to gain advantages not provided in their home state. For 
example, the practice of “borrowing” a tax treaty by forming an entity 
(usually a corporation) in a country that has a favorable tax treaty with 
the country of source generally constitutes treaty shopping.39 No doubt 
treaty drafters in the last forty years have become more sophisticated in 
response, but invariably, treaty-shopping activity has developed in kind,40 
using mechanisms such as “conduit” or “stepping-stone” companies to 
position themselves or their assets in the treaty nation. Both the OECD41 
and the UN 42  consider such mechanisms “improper” because they 
interfere with the reciprocity of interests underlying the treaty and 
undermine further international cooperation (as tax payers of ultimate 
beneficiary country can circumvent their way into treaty status).43  
With these issues in mind, domestic law makers may try to bridge 
the gap between tax treaties and abuse with specific legislation or 
executive action. For example, in the 1990’s, the German government 
realized that the provisions of its Germany-Ireland Tax Treaty, which 
exempted the interest and dividends from German tax that a German 
company derives from an Irish subsidiary, was leading German 
companies—especially banks—from routing substantial investment 
                                   
36 The term, shopping was appropriated from the term forum shopping, which describes the 
situation in U.S. civil procedure in which a litigant tries to “shop” jurisdictions to get a more a 
favorable decision. See BECKER, HELMUT & WU ̈RM, TREATY SHOPPING: AN EMERGING TAX ISSUE 
AND ITS PRESENT STATUS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 2 (1988). 
37 Although some would consider them separate, “abuse” is in contravention of the treaty and 
“shopping” is not in contravention of the treaty itself but of not being a proper beneficiary of it ab 
initio. 
38 The OECD lists four key factors to determine whether a jurisdiction is a “tax haven”, (i) 
zero or only nominal taxes (ii) lack of governmental transparency, (iii) the existence of laws or 
administrative practices that prevent the effective exchange of information for tax purposes with 
other governments on taxpayers, and (iv) the absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial 
in the tax haven country. See OECD HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: TAX HAVEN CRITERIA, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_33745_30575447_1_1_1_37427,00.html 
39 See David Rosenbloom, Derivative Benefits: Emerging US Treaty Policy, 22 INTERTAX 83 
(1994). David Rosenbloom served as International Tax Counsel in the U.S. Treasury Department 
from 1977 to 1981. 
40 See Richard L. Reinhold, What is Tax Treaty Abuse? (Is Treaty Shopping an Outdated 
Concept?), 53 TAX LAWYER 3 (2000). 
41 See OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, INT’L TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION, FOUR 
RELATED STUDIES 90 (1987). 
42 See U.N. ad hoc Group of Experts on Int’l Co-operation in Tax Matters, Prevention of 
Abuse of Tax Treaties 96, Nov. 30-Dec. 11, 1987. 
43 Kyung Geun Lee, Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Treaty Abuse and 
Treaty Shopping, at 30, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2006/2 (2006). 
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income through existing or special purpose Irish subsidiaries, taxed at 
favorable rates in Ireland.44 In response, the German parliament passed 
Article 20(2) of the International Transactions Tax Act (ITTA) to prevent 
treaty shopping activities of capital investment.45 The new rules of the 
ITTA focused on two mechanisms. One mechanism treated the profit of 
an overseas subsidiary established in Ireland as the dividend of a 
Germany parent company by applying the Germany Controlled Foreign 
Company rules to an overseas capital investment company that enjoys 
the tax exemption benefit of the tax treaty and tax the profit in Germany. 
Another mechanism does not award the tax exemption benefit by a tax 
treaty in the case of an overseas permanent establishment but allows a 
foreign tax credit in cases where the overseas permanent establishment is 
actually involved in the capital investment activity. Thus, although an 
overseas entity enjoys a tax treaty benefit in Ireland, it is subject to 
taxation in Germany, and as a result, all of the tax exemption effect in 
Ireland is absorbed by the German government. 
The focus of this German law and those like it is not generally 
considered a repudiation of the treaty as a whole, nor is it premised on a 
lack of respect for international law and treaty obligations. It merely 
addresses a specific abuse situation. As discussed above, in this case, 
governments are usually in a better position than a supranational 
approach to tackle the issue of German banks shopping into Ireland. The 
question is how this action, which contravenes a treaty on its face, (i.e., it 
prevents a tax payer from having access to a benefit which the treaty 
provides that it should) can still be consistent with the treaty itself. It 
seems almost like a contradiction in terms. 
The OECD Commentary on Article 1, paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 
(inserted in 2003) recognizes two possible rationales to deflect this 
contradiction. The first rationale is to characterize treaty abuse and 
therefore a country’s response to treaty abuse as outside of the  actual 
scope of the treaty, (i.e., the treaty only applies to tax payers who act in 
good faith and in line with the purpose and intent of the treaty itself). The 
second rationale is to consider that because the tax itself is levied at a 
domestic level, domestic action to prevent abuse is inherently a domestic 
issue. These approaches, albeit having some appeal, are somewhat 
circular in logic and ignore some fundamentals of treaty law supremacy, 
                                   
44 See CHARLES HACCIUS, IRELAND IN INT’L TAX PLANNING 897-98 (2004). 
45  See C. BELLSTEDT, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS TAX ACT AND ADMINISTRATION 
PRINCIPLES ON INCOME ALLOCATION - AUßENSTEUERGESETZ UND VERWALTUNGSGRUNDSÄTZE ZU 
VERRECHNUNGSPREISEN (1983). 
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thus their logic has been criticized.46 
Despite these shortcomings, the OECD appears to support domestic 
efforts to prevent abuse. OECD Commentary states at 9.4 that “States do 
not have to grant the benefits of a double taxation convention where 
arrangements that constitute an abuse of the provisions of the convention 
have been entered into.” Hence, states can point to clear OECD authority 
for taking unilateral action to prevent abuse or shopping of their treaty 
obligations or benefits—irrespective of its inconsistency with the textual 
norms of a treaty it itself is a party to. 
B. Interpretative Issues 
The interpretation of “terms” and “provisions” of a treaty may be 
performed by State actors in the absence of clear guidance in the treaty 
itself by reference to a state’s own law without it being considered an 
impeachment or override of the treaty itself. “Interpretation” is an 
important part of treaty compliance because tax treaties are generally not 
overly complex documents. The OECD Model Convention is 37 pages 
and 30 articles long and typifies the usual content of operative clauses in 
most bilateral conventions.47 It is comparatively brief next to Title 26 of 
the United States Code dealing with tax, which has almost 10,000 
sections spanning over 3,000 pages. The natural implication then is that 
it is difficult to resolve all issues related to international transactions in 
treaty form. Accordingly, a common issue occurs as to whether domestic 
tax law can be applied to matters that are not provided in a tax treaty. 
In relation to specific terminology issues, such as when trying to 
define the meaning of a term that is not provided in a tax treaty, 
paragraph 2, Article 2 of OECD Model Tax Convention provides that the 
undefined term will have the legal meaning of the taxing state above any 
other state. For example, paragraph 2, Article 2 of the United States–
Republic of Korea Tax Convention 197648 provides that the laws of the 
state “whose tax is being determined” is used to define otherwise 
undefined terms. However, when a term is not easily interpreted and 
given meaning by the laws of both states, reflecting the cooperative 
purpose of the bilateral treaty, paragraph 3, Article 25 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention provides a general guiding principal that “the 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve 
                                   
46 See Lee, supra note 43, at 8-9. 
47 Note, however, that the official OECD Commentaries on the Model Convention amount to 
383 pages and increase in size with each new edition. 
48 Income Tax Convention, U.S.-S. Kor., June 4, 1976, 30 U.S.T. 5253. 
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by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the 
interpretation or application of the Convention.”49 While this does not 
create specifically enforceable legal mechanisms, it does use the sort of 
language that international courts50 would use in requiring a “good faith” 
resolution, in some respects, stopping state actors from making 
disingenuous interpretations of clear language.51  
A similar issue exists in resolving conflicts related to the 
interpretation of tax treaty “provisions” apart from mere specific tax 
treaty “terms.” A “provision” is usually not defined in the treaties, but 
generally, it should be considered to be the effect or application of an 
article in a treaty (or operative subpart of an article). Although paragraph 
2, Article 3 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides guidelines as 
to how to interpret the terms of a tax treaty, it does not mention anything 
about how to interpret its provisions. Commentary 3 of the Introduction 
of the 2005 OECD Model Tax Convention emphasizes that OECD 
members should conform to the Model Convention “as interpreted by the 
Commentaries thereon” when applying and interpreting the “provisions” 
of their bilateral tax conventions. The Commentaries for member 
countries therefore take on an important role. 
For example, the important concept of “resident” for tax purposes is 
reasonably central to determining liability. Paragraph 1, Article 3 of the 
current Korea-U.S. Tax Treaty provides that “resident,” when in the U.S., 
refers to the U.S. legal definition of the term, and when in Korea, vice-
versa. However, the situation is complicated because Korean income tax 
law52 applies a different definition that is not mutually exclusive to U.S. 
income tax law in determining individual residency.53 Therefore it is 
                                   
49 See also U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOV. 15, 2006, Technical Explanation, art. 3, para. 2 
(stating that “if the meaning of a term cannot be readily determined under the law of a Contracting State, or if there is 
a conflict in meaning under the laws of the two States that creates difficulties in the application of the Convention, the 
competent authorities, as indicated in paragraph 3(f) of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), may establish a 
common meaning in order to prevent double taxation or to further any other purpose of the Convention”). 
50 See Nuclear Tests, Austl. v. Fr., 1974 I.C.J. 268. 
51 See J.F. O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-9 (1991). 
52 Income Tax Act, art. 1, para. 1, (Act No. 9672/2009) (Kor.). The Korean standard as found 
in Paragraph 1, Article 1 of the Korean Income Tax Law provides that a resident is “[a] person who 
holds his domicile in Korea or has held his temporary domicile in Korea for one year or more.” In 
addition, in Article 2 of the Presidential Decree, the Korean Income Tax Law provides that “the 
domicile shall be determined based on the objective facts such as a family living together and a 
property situated in Korea, and the abode shall be the place where an individual stays for a 
substantial period but does not lead a normal life unlike a domicile.” The Presidential Decree also 
provides that “where an individual who resides in Korea has (i) an occupation which requires more 
than one year of continuous stay in Korea or (ii) has a family living together and is judged to reside 
for more than one year in light of his occupation and property, he shall be treated as having a 
domicile in Korea.” 
53 Section 7701(b) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code treats an alien individual as a U.S. 
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entirely possible that a Korean may be a “resident” of both countries 
simultaneously. A tie-breaker rule provided for in paragraph 2, Article 3 
of the Korea-U.S. tax treaty54 can be applied, which looks at factors such 
as permanent residence, vital interests and citizenship, but again, the end 
result can be “equal,” and in this case the treaty provides that the 
question is settled by “mutual agreement.”55 This provides a top-down 
example of how interpretation questions are dealt with in tax treaty 
practice, invariably a combination of analyzing the treaty text, domestic 
law, and in the absence or certainty of good faith, application of mutual 
agreement.  
In this respect, interpreting treaty terms by referencing and applying 
domestic law is countenanced as complimentary to treaty practice and is 
part of the harmony between international and domestic law. However, 
that is not to say that countries do not use “interpretation” as a weapon in 
tax treaty disputes. For example, in paragraph 3, Article 11 of the 
Austria-Spain tax treaty56, government securities were taxed only in the 
issuance state. The unintended consequence of this provision, from the 
Austrian perspective, was that pursuant to the Spanish government’s 
issuance of short-term government securities, a marked increase of 
capital moved from Austria to Spain in order to use the issuance state’s 
                                                                              
resident where such an individual is (i) lawfully admitted for permanent residence, (26 C.F.R. § 
301.7701(b)–1(b)(1) (2009) “Green card test: An alien is a resident alien with respect to a calendar 
year if the individual is a lawful permanent resident at any time during the calendar year. A lawful 
permanent resident is an individual who has been lawfully granted the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws. Resident 
status is deemed to continue unless it is rescinded or administratively or judicially determined to 
have been abandoned.”) (ii) meets the substantial presence test, (An individual meets the substantial 
test with respect to any calendar year if (i) such individual was present in the United States on at 
least thirty-one days during the calendar year, and (ii) the sum of the number of days on which such 
individual was present in the United States during the current year and the two preceding calendar 
years (when multiplied by the applicable multiplier: current year – 1, first preceding year – 1/3, 
second preceding year – 1/6) equals or exceeds 183 days.) or (iii) makes a first year election. 
54 Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph (1) an individual is a resident of both 
Contracting States: (a) He shall be deemed to be a resident of that Contracting State in which he 
maintains his permanent home; (b) If he has a permanent home in both Contracting States or in 
neither of the Contracting States, he shall be deemed to be a resident of that Contracting State with 
which his personal and economic relationships are closest (center of vital interests); (c) If his center 
of vital interests is in neither of the Contracting States or cannot be determined, he shall be deemed 
to be a resident of that Contracting State in which he has a habitual abode; (d) If he has a habitual 
abode in both Contracting States or in neither of the Contracting States, he shall be deemed to be a 
resident of the Contracting State of which he is a citizen; and (e) If he is a citizen of both Contracting 
States or of neither Contracting States the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall settle 
the question by mutual agreement. For the purpose of this paragraph, a permanent home is the place 
where an individual dwells with his family 
55 Income Tax Convention, U.S.-S. Kor., supra note 48, art. 3, para. 2(e).  
56 Double Taxation Convention, Austria-Spain, art. 11, para. 3, Dec. 20, 1966, BGBl 395/1967 
as amended in BGBl 709/1995.   
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exemption rule. In response, the Austrian tax authority changed its 
position to define “government securities” provided in paragraph 3, 
Article 11 of the Austria-Spain tax treaty to mean only mid- or long-term 
securities. In order to entrench this position domestically and avoid 
domestic tax payer’s disputes relating to the interpretation of the Austria-
Spain tax treaty, the Austrian parliament adopted a new domestic law 
providing that paragraph 3, Article 11 of the Austria-Spain tax treaty 
would not be effective from January 1, 1995, and then it amended the 
existing Austria-Spain tax treaty. 
If there is no consensus on interpretation—despite (or perhaps 
because of a lack of) good faith negotiations—specific adjudicative 
intervention may be required. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
which is the United Nations’ principal judicial body, 57  can hear 
disputes58 between states if the states have subjected themselves to ICJ 
jurisdiction.59 This requirement limits the ICJ’s effectiveness.60 Only 
states themselves have standing to bring a case before the ICJ. Questions 
of interpretation with regard to application of a treaty can also arise 
before domestic administrative authorities or courts when a taxpayer, 
either a private citizen or entity, disagrees with how its domestic country 
has interpreted the treaty with respect to a benefit it wishes to receive.61 
The interpretation of tax treaties may also be the subject of civil action 
between taxpayers themselves.62  
C. International Treaty Override 
Treaty override is the exclusion of a treaty or the negating of its 
effect, in whole or in part, by a treaty member by means of a deliberate 
                                   
57 See Statute of the Int’l Ct. of Justice, art. 1 (1945). 
58 See id. at art. 38. 
59 See JUAN ANGEL BECERRA, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF TAX TREATIES IN 
NORTH AMERICA, 40, (2007). 
60 For example, in response to a high profile case brought by Nicaragua in 1984 complaining 
about U.S. support for guerilla warriors in its borders, the United States withdrew from the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1986. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (June 27). 
61 See, e.g., Comm’r of Taxation v. Lamesa Holdings BV (1997) 77 FCR 597 (Austl.), 
(holding that the relevant provisions of the Alienation of Property Article in the 
Australia/Netherlands Double Tax Agreement did not extend to an effective alienation of Australian 
real property held by a non-resident through a chain of companies that was achieved by the sale of 
shares in one of those companies); Edwards v. The Queen, [2002] C.T.C. 331 (Can.) (finding that 
the Canada-China tax treaty did not apply to Hong Kong); KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., KLAUS VOGEL ON 
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 33 (1999). 
62 See, e.g., Indofood Int’l Fin. Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London Branch [2006] STC 
1195, a U.K. court of Appeal case concerning the meaning of “beneficial ownership” in double tax 
conventions. 
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act of supervening domestic legislation. Treaty override impedes 
harmonization and cooperation because such actions by one state create 
disincentives for other states to join and uphold international treaties. If 
countries that are signatories to a treaty may merely legislate “over the 
top” of their treaty obligations, then countries will invariably question 
the utility of treaties. This concern is especially pertinent to tax treaties 
because they govern an important component of international commerce. 
Unilateral and arbitrary override of treaty provisions by government 
players obviously disrupts the certainty and predictability of tax status 
for multinational trade. Treaty override can have the unilateral impact of 
infringing upon the taxing rights of the other contracting state and, in that 
way, it upsets the balance that cooperative powers have made in treaty 
form between their own interests and international cooperation, causing a 
tit-for-tat unwinding63 of cooperative tax laws.  
Treaty override is inconsistent with the principle of “pacta sunt 
servanda” incorporated in the Vienna Convention, which provides that 
“every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”64 The Convention also states that “a 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty.”65  
Because the international implications of treaty override are serious 
(and usually resisted by the impugned nation), it is important to know 
when an action that circumvents a treaty is an override and when it is not. 
Unfortunately there is no clear consensus on the parameters of what a 
treaty override is. This paper has discussed the practical implications of 
treaty interpretation and measures taken by a state to prevent treaty abuse. 
It is generally accepted that it is not treaty override merely to interpret a 
treaty term or provision in a domestic setting, nor is it a treaty override in 
some cases to enact legislation to support anti-avoidance. Treaty override 
is therefore defined often by what it is not, rather than what it is. It is in 
this gray area that most cases usually lie. This measure of uncertainty is 
unsatisfactory and counterproductive to the high level of international 
                                   
63 See Derek Devgun, International Fiscal Wars for the Twenty-First Century: An Assessment of 
Tax-Based Trade Retaliation, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 353, 374 (1996). “The OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs noted in its 1989 report on treaty override that ‘there is growing dissatisfaction with 
the continued use of [treaty override] legislation which would erode confidence in the international 
tax treaty network as a whole,’ even in situations where an objective might justify its use (such as to 
counteract treaty shopping). As a result, the Committee concluded that override was not an 
appropriate manner in which to modify tax treaty obligations and strongly urged OECD members to 
avoid legislation that would constitute a treaty override.” 
64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
65 Id. at art. 27. 
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cooperation needed for effective tax harmonization. 
It may be beneficial to posit whether it is domestically permissible 
for a legislature to “override” the effect of international treaty. “Self-
regulation” of international affairs can be an important bulwark 
protecting international cooperation; that is, if a government externally 
binds itself by treaty, in some circumstances, this treaty has “supremacy” 
and it may be impermissible for that country to later internally override 
those provisions by “mere” legislation. However, there is no 
international consensus on this hierarchy. Just as there are many 
divergent forms of political systems throughout the world, there are 
many approaches to the question of how to deal with treaty obligations 
and what pre-eminence to give them over domestic situations and 
legislation. Even between political systems that are inherently similar, 
the approach may be markedly different. A robust body of legal theory 
has grown up around the relationship between domestic and treaty law, 
but it too has marked schisms. 
A starting point for the analysis of the hierarchy of domestic treaty is 
to look at a classification of the treaty as self-executing.66 A self-
executing treaty can be executed without special legislation; it is 
effective immediately upon the compact of the treaty nations without the 
need for ancillary legislation at the domestic level. Contrast this with 
non-self-executing treaty, which requires each nation’s domestic 
legislature to ratify it by corresponding legislation. This distinction is 
important because a self-executing treaty is effectively binding on 
national parties from the start. Whether a treaty provision is self-
executing is an exceedingly confusing area in U.S. federal law, one that 
has spurred inconsistent cases and a great deal of academic 
commentary. 67  Generally, one will need to look at the form and 
substance of a treaty to determine whether it is self-executing, but 
generally speaking, a tax treaty qualifies as self-executing. The self-
executing form of a treaty creates a rebuttable presumption as to its place 
in the hierarchy of legal norms between international and domestic law.  
There are two general theories as to the hierarchy. First, “monism” 
regards a treaty as part of a national legal system, and second, “dualism” 
regards a treaty as a legal system distinguished from the national legal 
system. According to “dualism,” there is no relationship between 
                                   
66 See Ford v. U.S., 273 U.S. 593; Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing? 
20 AM. J. INT’L L. 444. See also David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: 
Equivalence, Duality, and Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228 (2010).  
67 See Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Self-Executing 
Treaty that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 26 
DENV. J. INT’L & POL’Y 533, 553 (1998).  
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international and domestic laws: international laws are effective only in 
the international relationship, and domestic laws are effective only in 
domestic settings. Monism on the other hand presents international laws 
and domestic laws as a unified order, but it is again divided between the 
international law priority theory and the domestic law or equal status 
priority theory.  
The late Klaus Vogel,68 emeritus professor at the University of 
Munich, is best known among scholars advocating a monism position 
that tax treaties are equivalent to “special” legislation, 69  having a 
hierarchical position that has priority over general domestic legislation. 
This theory provides that subsequent general legislation does not 
override previous special legislation and therefore provides that treaties 
will remain in force, despite domestic changes. If legislation contradicts 
an existing international treaty, it is a violation of international law. 
Many countries have assumed a priority approach as to treaty law. 
The French civil system, for example, favors accord with international 
law. Article 55 of the French Constitution, provides that a treaty has 
priority over general laws upon its proclamation.70 Domestic law in 
France is subrogated to international treaty obligations. The Japanese 
civil system, which borrows heavily from the French tradition, also gives 
a treaty priority over a law.71 The Swiss Constitution, Article 5, provides 
that international law has priority over domestic law. 72  The 1994 
Moldovan Constitution Article 4(2) gives priority to treaty law (but only 
with respect to the protection of human rights) and Article 7 of the Civil 
Code expressly provides for the priority of treaty law.73 In Australia, tax 
treaties concluded with other states are enforced domestically according 
to the International Tax Agreements Act (“ITAA”), which was 
established in 1953.74 According to paragraph 2, Article 4 of ITAA, a 
tax treaty has priority over a domestic tax law.75 Similarly, section 15(3) 
of the Act on Administrative Procedures of Latvia provides that 
                                   
68 Klaus Vogel is probably the best known legal theorist on tax treaties, having published some 
15 books and approximately 200 articles before his death in 2007. 
69 It is special in the European sense of having the highest authority, not “special” in the 
American sense, which refers to specific laws applying only to a particular locality or person. 
70 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.) 
71  See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 2 (states that both treaties 
concluded by Japan and established international law must be faithfully observed), see also Japan v. 
Kim Sun-Ki, 92 A.J.I.L. 301 (Matsue Dist. Ct., 1997). 
72  See BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 5 (Switz.). 
73 
 See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA, July 29, 1994, art. 4(2); CODUL CIVILAL 
REPUBLICII MOLDOVA, art. 7, (2002).  
74 
 See International Tax Agreements Act, 1953, ATS, art. 4, para.2   
75 
 See id. 
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international legislation, regardless of its source, is applicable in 
accordance with its position in the hierarchy of legal force of external 
legislation.76 Where a discrepancy emerges between an international 
legislative provision and a Latvian legislative provision with equal legal 
force, the international legislative provision prevails.77 Note that the 
Australian, Moldovan and Latvian examples of treaty superiority, as it 
applies to taxes, are merely statutory, unlike the other examples in this 
paragraph, which are constitutional. 
The American approach has generally been one of equal status—that 
is, treaty law is of equal status to domestic legislation.78 Hence, just as 
with any other domestic law conflict, the “later-in-time” legislation is 
binding if there is a contradiction.79 The Korean approach has been 
similar. Paragraph 1, Article 1 of the Korean Constitution provides that 
treaties concluded and promulgated based on the Korean Constitution 
and generally approved international rules have the same effect as 
domestic laws. Further, Article 5 of the Supplementary Provision of the 
Korean Constitution provides that laws and treaties are effective only in 
the cases where they do not infringe upon the Constitution. Where 
treaties are in conflict with domestic laws, the priority must be 
determined by the later-in-time rule.80 
This approach falls far short of the concept of “pacta sunt servanda” 
incorporated in the Vienna Convention, Article 26. It should be noted 
that although the United States signed this treaty on April 24, 1970, to 
date, the U.S. Senate has not given its advice and consent to make it 
legally binding in the United States. The constitutional context of treaty 
law in the U.S. is found in Article VI, section 1, clause 2, which provides 
that  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
                                   
76 
 See Administrative Procedure Law, sec. 15(3), (2003).   
77  See id. 
78 See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 24 (1994). 
79 Timothy S. Guenther, Tax Treaties and Overrides: The Multiple-Party Financing Dilemma, 
16 VA. TAX REV. 645, 646-47 (1997). 
80 See SUNG LARK IN, THE KOREAN CONSTITUTION 207 (2003).  
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This has been interpreted from the earliest cases of the U.S. Supreme 
Court to mean that statutes and treaties have equal status or, in other 
words, a treaty “may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of 
Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”81 As it relates to tax law, the 
Internal Revenue Code codifies the doctrine of equal status at § 
7852(d)(1), which states, “For purposes of determining the relationship 
between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting 
revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by 
reason of its being a treaty or law.” Further, § 7701(l) provides authority 
to promulgate regulations necessary to prevent the avoidance of tax 
through treaty shopping and other “conduit arrangements” of treaty 
abuses.  
Most cases discussing the general issue of equal status were 
determined in the 1880s82, and the U.S. Supreme Court has not made any 
further judgments concerning treaty override since the Prohibition era 
case of Cook v. United States.83 In that case, a 1924 treaty between the 
United States and Britain allowed the United States to board and inspect 
British vessels in international waters if not more than one hour of 
voyage time from the U.S. territorial zone or three miles from land. Later, 
§ 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930 gave power to stop and board any vessel 
at any place within four leagues (twelve miles) of the coast of the United 
States to search the ships, particularly for contraband. In this case, a 
British ship was boarded on suspicion of carrying alcohol at a point 
further away than the treaty would allow, but within the distance the later 
act would allow. The Supreme Court, somewhat in response to the 
ambiguities of the situation, said in relation to the treaty, that it is not 
“abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part 
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”84 This confirms two things: (i) 
the United States may certainly override a treaty, but (ii) the treaty must 
be relied upon as law unless a later statute clearly expresses the override.   
The result of “equal status” is that there is no overriding legal reason 
why a U.S. tax law cannot override an earlier treaty. One can look at the 
provisions of § 884 of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 as an example 
of treaty override in action. This section created a system of withholding 
                                   
81 Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U. S. 616, 621 (1870). 
82 The Cherokee Tobacco case was about a particular tax on tobacco, and a number of cases 
have followed en suite in relation to other types of powers: Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 
536 (1884) (Immigration); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (Customs Duties); Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888): (Customs Duties); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889) 
(Ejectment). 
83 Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
84 See id. at 120. 
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obligations and repatriation rules designed to eliminate the disparity 
between foreign branch operations of U.S. companies with foreign 
subsidiaries.85 Known as the “branch profit rule” (BPR), it was enacted 
in the same vein as other U.S. rules, such as the “earnings stripping rule,” 
“multiparty financing regulation rule,” and “reverse hybrid rule,” which 
sought equity between subsidiary-branch level transactions and 
prevention of fiscal evasion.  
Before 1986, a foreign corporation that carried out business through 
a U.S. branch had an obligation to pay only corporate income tax for 
profit realized by the U.S. branch but no obligation to pay a dividend tax 
on funds remitted from foreign branches. However, pursuant to the BPR, 
the tax burden of these foreign corporations has increased, whereas the 
taxing rights of a state in which the foreign corporation is situated has 
decreased.  
For example, assume that an Australian corporation does business in 
the United States through a U.S. branch and realizes $100,000 of profit. 
Before the BPR, at the U.S. company tax rate of 35% with no other tax 
other than income tax, the branch pays $35,000 of income tax to the U.S. 
government and can remit the remaining $65,000 to Australia. However, 
if the U.S. government imposes the BPR, the corporation must pay 30% 
of branch profit tax on the remaining $65,000 to be remitted in addition 
to $35,000 of federal income tax. The Australian government will credit 
against both the corporate income tax and the branch profit tax, so the 
Australian company is no worse off; however, the taxing right of the 
Australian government has shrunk. When the BPR was enacted, the 
United States was party to tax treaties specifically forbidding taxing of 
distributions from foreign corporations resident in a treaty country to 
their foreign shareholders even if the distribution came out of earnings of 
a U.S. branch.86 
Compare the U.S. BPR with the new rules of ITTA. The German 
approach does not affect the taxing rights of the Irish Government: it 
merely has an impact on German financial institutions seeking to unfairly 
                                   
85 Under Internal Revenue Code § 884(a), a tax equal to 30% of the dividend equivalent 
amount is imposed on any foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 884(e) provides, “No treaty between the 
United States and a foreign country shall exempt any foreign corporation from the branch profit tax 
unless (i) such treaty is an income tax treaty and (ii) such foreign corporation is a qualified resident 
of such foreign country.” I.R.C. § 884(e)(4) provides that the qualified resident means, with respect 
to any foreign country, any foreign corporation which is a resident of such foreign country unless (i) 
50 percent or more of the stock of such foreign corporation is owned by individuals who are not 
residents of such foreign country and who are not United States citizens or resident aliens, or (ii) 50 
percent or more of its income is used to meet liabilities to persons who are not residents of such 
foreign country or citizens or residents of the United States. 
86 See GUGLIELMO MAISTO, TAX TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 75-76 (2006) 
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conduit away taxable income from German authorities. Compared to the 
BPR, which is both contradictory to treaty obligations and repugnant to 
the mutual protection of tax revenue, the ITTA is not a treaty override as 
it is consistent with the intent of the treaty with Ireland (or at least not 
contradictory). 
The United States tried to overcome this clear override by 
announcing that the BPR would not apply to residents of those treaty 
countries until the treaties were renegotiated to permit it. Most U.S. 
treaties have been similarly renegotiated. That process does not provide, 
however, that § 884(e) is consistent with existing treaties. Both on its 
face and as supported by legislative history, the provision is clearly 
intended to override pre-existing treaty obligations.87  
The United States is not alone in being criticized for treaty override 
action. Many have argued that section 62 of Britain’s Finance (No. 2) 
Act, established in 1987, is clear override in relation to the U.K.’s tax 
treaty with the sovereign state of Jersey.88 The legislation was enacted to 
reverse the decision of Padmore v. IRC, which dealt with a Jersey-based 
intellectual property consulting firm known as “CPA.”  
Padmore, a U.K. resident, was a partner of the firm, notwithstanding 
that the business of the firm was carried out from its offices in Jersey and 
its day-to-day business was dealt with by three managing partners, who 
were Jersey residents. Padmore claimed that his share of partner profits 
were exempt from British income tax because they were the profits of a 
Jersey partnership by reference to paragraph 3(2) of the treaty which 
states that “[t]he industrial or commercial profits of a Jersey enterprise 
shall not be subject to United Kingdom tax unless the enterprise is 
engaged in trade or business in the United Kingdom through a permanent 
establishment situated therein.”89 Ultimately, the High Court agreed and 
held that since CPA was a partnership in Jersey and did not carry on its 
business through a permanent establishment in the United Kingdom, the 
British Government could not tax Mr. Padmore, a partner of CPA and a 
British resident. In response, the Crown amended its legislation to 
specifically say that a U.K. resident who, as a member of a partnership 
outside of the U.K., receives partner income, which is otherwise not 
taxable because of a tax treaty, is to be taxed in the U.K.  
In Korea, there have been some rules to prevent certain abuses, for 
                                   
87 See Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits 
Tax and Congressional Abrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW 173, 201 (1989). 
88 See Double Taxation Arrangement, U.K.-Jersey, June 24, 1952, SI1952 No1216 
as amended 
89 See id. para. 3(2). 
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example, a “thin capitalization rule,”90 which fits within the general 
rubric of anti-abuse and anti-shopping measures consistent with OECD 
models and commentary.91 Contrast this however, with Article 98-5 of 
the Corporate Tax Law, which provides that a Korean tax agent must 
withhold taxes on interest, dividends, royalties, etc. at the domestic rate 
going to a foreign country if the Korean Ministry of Finance and 
Economy designates the income holder’s beneficial country as an 
“Article 98-5 country.” This is in spite of a limited tax rate stipulated in a 
tax treaty with that country. Further, if that “designation” is made, only 
when a foreign company gets advance approval from the Commissioner 
of the National Tax Service can a Korean withholding agent withhold 
taxes according to a tax treaty with that country. This is essentially a 
“carte blanche” law that allows the Korean Executive branch to overturn 
the treaty on a country-by-country basis, and if it does, the presumption 
in respect to treaty compliance is reversed. This is clearly a treaty 
override.  
As discussed, in both U.S. and Korean domestic law, both nations 
have the right to override pre-existing treaties (a right that it does not 
have at international law). However, the “right” to override does not 
make treaty override desirable as a matter of policy.92 In this vein, treaty 
override action has come under heavy criticism in the United States and 
abroad for a number of reasons. For example, the international customary 
law violation of override damages a country’s reputation as a member of 
the global community, the international legal order itself, and erodes the 
trust among treaty partners that the powerful countries will remain 
faithful to their treaty obligations.93  
 Legislative overrides harm domestic interests because an increasing 
number of treaty partners have insisted upon the right to renegotiate or 
retaliate in the event of a legislative override. The U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, for example, has indicated that “it is also becoming 
increasingly difficult to negotiate reciprocal concessions when the 
foreign government fears that the United States may unilaterally reverse 
the bargain by legislative action.”94 This department, which has the 
                                   
90 See Law for Coordination of International Tax Affairs, art. 14, para. 1. Korea (providing 
that when the amount of a loan borrowed from an overseas controlling shareholder and a third party 
by the payment guarantee of an overseas controlling shareholder exceeds three times the amount of 
paid-in capital by an overseas controlling shareholder, the interest related to the excessive loan shall 
not be deductible and treated as dividend or other disposition). 
91 See OECD, supra note 7, art. 4, para. 3; OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND 
ON CAPITAL, art. 1 cmt. 23 (2005).  
92 See Doernberg supra note 87, at 201.  
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
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principal responsibility for tax treaty negotiation, has been opposed to 
the statutory override of such treaties.95  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has provided salient examples of how individual states act 
in self-interested ways to protect their revenue base, sometimes to the 
detriment of international treaties. While this paper reveals that this 
action is sometimes sanctioned or countenanced by supranational norms, 
the approach is neither consistent with the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, nor is it immune from criticism as to its circular logic and vain 
precedential value.  
Treaty override is an obvious impediment to the stability of 
international tax treaties. This paper has discussed acceptable allowances 
to domestic sovereignty over tax treaty, such as interpretation and anti-
avoidance measures. However, inequalities arise because nations deal 
with conflicts between domestic and international law in different ways. 
Because of these differences, individual states should not be left to 
determine for themselves through domestic legislation which 
international treaties they will comply with.  
Therefore, an apparent first step to unlocking the full potential of 
international tax law is to develop an international consensus of how 
conflicts between domestic and international laws will be handled by the 
global community. As the global community develops an international 
consensus built upon a robust basis of law, cooperation, and anti-
exceptionalism, the strength and vitality of international law will in turn 
fortify the global community and facilitate greater global interaction.  
                                   
95 See David Sachs, Is the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Overriding Good Law for Modern 
Day Tax Treaties, 47 TAX LAW. 867, 874 (1994) (noting that when the 1986 overrides were under 
consideration by Congress, then Secretary of the Treasury Baker wrote to the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee urging Congress to give the Treasury time to renegotiate treaties rather 
than to override them. His request was not heeded). 
